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1. Introduction 
 Since the 1883 Paris Convention, there have been considerable efforts being made to 
harmonize patent laws internationally, culminating in the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under the auspices of the WTO. 1 
However, patent law still remains independently administered and enforced by each country, 
creating substantial administrative, financial, and legal costs to multinational corporations 
operating in technologically sensitive industries. 
 The present paper focuses on one important difference in patent law administration 
between the U.S. and the rest of the world. When two persons apply for a patent on virtually 
identical inventions, the patent issues to the person who filed his application first. This simple 
rule, however, does not apply in the U.S., where instead the patent issues to the person who 
demonstrates to have discovered the invention first. After decades of resisting reform, the U. S. 
finally enacted the America Invents Act of 2011 so as to formally switch to a first-to-file (“FTF”) 
system on March 16, 2013. 
 This policy change however is not without a controversy. The opposition to patent law 
reform in the U.S. has argued that its first-to-invent (“FTI”) rule is designed to protect small 
inventors, who take a longer time to prepare patent applications compared with major corporate 
inventors. On closer inspection, however, this argument does not hold much water today. First, 
the recent patent law reform in the U.S. has created a new provisional patent application, which is 
much simpler to file.2 Second, in the current U.S. FTI system, disputes over priority of invention 
must be settled in a legal proceeding called “interference,” which involves examining laboratory 
logbooks, establishing dates for prototypes, and so forth at a hearing before the USPTO (U.S. 
                                                   
1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm. Also see Moser (2005) for a general view on patents 
and innovation. 
2 See Lerner (2003). 
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Patent and Trademark Office) Board.3 In one estimate the mean adjudication cost of interference 
stands at $656,306 (Hart 2007). Since interference costs are borne equally by the parties 
involved, the FTI rule does not necessarily protect financially constrained small inventors. The 
fact that interference does not help small individual inventors against large corporations is 
confirmed in an empirical study of Cohen and Ishii (2005).4  
 Despite these counterarguments, the opposition often adduces the undeniable fact that the 
U.S. has led the world in R&D for more than a century and attributes it to the FTI feature of its 
patent law that has existed since 1836. 5  Although the opposition has offered no logical 
connection between these facts, Lo and Sutthiphisal (2009) find that, when Canada made a 
similar switch from FTI to FTF in 1989, Canadian R&D efforts actually fell. Thus, it seems a bit 
premature to dismiss the opposition’s argument outright. More importantly, since the U.S. 
economy is substantially larger than the Canadian counterpart, it is possible that the U.S. decision 
to adopt a FTF rule has far greater ramifications on worldwide R&D activities. 
 The objective of the present paper therefore is to formally evaluate the worldwide effect 
of the U.S. decision to switch from FTI to FTF. To that end, we develop a dynamic model of 
R&D in which two firms compete to develop a product in a two-country world, the U.S. and the 
rest of the world. Product development takes two sequential inventions, i.e., basic technology and 
its commercialization or application design. Both inventions are assumed risky. Specifically, the 
hazard rates for the first invention depend on firms’ investments in R&D whereas those for the 
second are exogenous. This reflects our belief that basic research is more sensitive to firms’ 
capital outlays relative to its commercialization.  
                                                   
3 See Cohen and Ishii (2005) for a detailed study of the interference process.  
4 Cohen and Ishii (2005) also find that, contrary to folklore, most patent races are among major corporate 
research laboratories chasing well-defined research topics.   
5 For example, “It should be understood that it is because the U.S. has a first to invent structure and the rest of 
the world has a first to file structure that the U.S. is the production and employment machine that it is.” (See 
http//www.piausa.org/layout/set/print/patent_reform_issue.) 
  
3 
 
 Finally, we assume both inventions are patentable separately in two countries. Our focus 
is on whether basic invention is to be patented. Patenting basic invention gives the inventor the 
exclusive right to it but intensifies R&D competition for final invention, while not patenting it 
exposes the inventor to the risk of losing that right when the rival also discovers basic invention 
before the inventor discovers final invention. We show that whether to patent basic invention 
hinges crucially on the patent-issuing rule prevailing in both countries.  
 Now, our main results can be stated. First, if invention A (basic technology) gets patented 
both before and after patent law harmonization, harmonization has no effect whatsoever. On the 
other hand, if A does not get patented before harmonization, then a switch to FTF in the U.S. 
decreases R&D investments for basic research.6 We show that that scenario is more likely in 
industries where the final product generates more value inside the U.S.; for example, the 
pharmaceutical industry, where the U.S. leads the world with its share around 36%. 7  The 
semiconductor industry might be impacted similarly, since semiconductors are key components 
for modern consumer goods and aircraft manufacturing, two areas in which the U. S. is still 
dominant. 
 Even though basic research diminishes, it does not necessarily follow that final invention 
is delayed, because in a harmonized world the inventor, for instance, may choose to patent basic 
invention so that final invention is discovered sooner due to induced R&D competition for it. 
Due to such contrasting effects on basic and final inventions, the effect of a switch to FTF on 
total time needed to discover both inventions cannot be determined analytically in all cases. In 
such a case, our simulations show that a switch to FTF delays discovery of final invention for all 
the relevant parameter values we consider.  
                                                   
6 An exception is when firms file for a patent both before and after patent law harmonization, in which case, a 
switch to FTF has no effect whatsoever on R&D investments and welfare. 
7 Standard & Poor’s, Industry Surveys – Healthcare: Pharmaceuticals, June 2, 2011. 
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 Given the above results, it is then possible to make a welfare analysis. If consumers value 
only final invention, a delay in its discovery decreases consumer welfare. In this case, our 
simulations show that expected firm profits also fall for the same parameter values. With lower 
consumer surplus and firm profits, we conclude that world welfare falls. 
  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that formally studies the effect of 
international harmonization of the patent-issuing rules. Scotchmer and Green (1990) also 
compare the two rules, but they consider a single-country setting, leaving unexamined the effect 
of patent law harmonization and its characterizations in terms of country/market attributes as 
discussed here. More importantly, they assume fixed hazard rates for both basic and final 
inventions, thereby leaving unanswered the question how harmonization affects R&D incentives. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. The next section presents the 
model in detail. In sections 3 we depict a non-harmonized world, in which the U.S. uses a FTI 
rule while the rest of the world uses a FTF rule. In section 4 we turn to a harmonized world, in 
which both countries use FTF rule. In section 5 we compare the equilibrium levels of investment 
in R&D between the two. We conclude in section 6. 
2. Model setup 
 We consider a patent race between two agents for two inventions A and B. Inventions are 
sequential in that invention A must be discovered before invention B. Thus, invention A may 
represent a basic technology while invention B its application or commercialization.  
 Let αV and βV denote the worldwide values of inventions A and B, respectively, where 
α, β > 0, α + β = 1, and V represents the total value of the two inventions.8 Inventions A and B 
are independently patentable in each country. There are no application fees or any other fees for 
                                                   
8 Several authors [e.g., Chang (1995) and Kao (2009)] have used Nash bargaining to determine these shares. 
Since this has nothing to do with harmonization, we abstract from it and treat these weights as exogenous. Also, 
the weights α and β are assumed common across countries. 
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determination of priority and a patent is issued immediately when an application is filed. Let Vu 
and Vw denote the total valuations of the inventions in two countries, country u (= the U.S.) and 
country w (= the rest of the world), respectively, so that V ≡ Vu + Vw. With this system of 
notation we can write, for example, the value of the patent on A in the U.S. as α Vu, and the 
value of the patents on B in two countries as βV = β(Vu + Vw). 
 The model is set in an infinite time horizon, where time flows continuously from zero. At 
time t = 0, two symmetric agents start an R&D race for invention A. R&D is risky in that a 
discovery date τA of invention A is stochastic, with distribution given by; 
  Prob (τA ≤ t) = 1 – exp[- g(xi)t]. 
Here, g(xi), agent i’s hazard rate function, is strictly concave in xi, agent i’s R&D investment, and 
satisfy Inada conditions. Two agents’ discovery dates are independently distributed. Further, 
marginal R&D cost is assumed constant at one so xi denotes the cost of investment.
9 
 Given the setup, one agent eventually discovers A at a random date τA. Call this agent a 
“leader” and the other a “follower.” For clarity of exposition we refer to a leader by the feminine 
pronouns and a follower by the masculine pronouns. As soon as a leader is identified, she 
immediately starts R&D for invention B. Assume that a discovery date τB of invention B is 
exponentially distributed with constant hazard rate λ:  
  Prob (τB ≤ t) = 1 – exp(- λt). 
These assumptions may be reasonable if B is commercialization of A and depends more on trials 
and errors than the size of outlays in R&D facilities. Further, given the constant hazard rate, there 
is no loss of generality in assuming zero R&D cost for invention B. 
 When A is invented, the follower hears about it possibly through the media, but the 
information provided is insufficient for the follower to start R&D towards B, unless A is 
patented. Thus, by not patenting A, the leader can make a head start towards B unthreatened by 
                                                   
9 These features are standard in the literature; see Lee and Wilde (1980).  
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rivalry. However, that also exposes the leader to the risk of losing the exclusive right to A if the 
follower discovers A before she discovers B. This tradeoff must be taken into consideration when 
the leader decides whether to patent A. Her decision depends in part on the type of patent-issuing 
rule prevailing in each country. 
3. A world without patent law harmonization 
 In this section we consider a world without patent law harmonization, namely, the U.S. 
uses FTI while the rest of the world uses FTF. However, we begin with the analysis of 
competition for the leadership in a general setting, where ΠL and ΠF denote the (expected) 
profits from becoming a leader and a follower, respectively, evaluated at the date of discovery of 
A. The exact values of ΠL and ΠF depend on the equilibrium of the specific game considered and 
will be determined later in this section. 
3.A. Racing to be the leader 
 At time zero, two agents begin a race for invention A. Suppose that they reach time t > 0 
without success, which occurs with probability exp[- (g(xi) + g(xj))t], (i ≠ j). Conditional on that, 
agent i becomes a leader with probability g(xi)dt, and a follower with probability g(xj)dt during 
the short time interval dt. Thus, agent i’s (conditional) expected net profit at t is exp[- (g(xi) + 
g(xj))t][g(xi)ΠL + g(xj)ΠF – xi]dt. Integrating this expression over t yields the expected profit to 
agent i given by; 
  ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑒(−𝑟𝑟)∞0 𝑒𝑒𝑒�−�𝑔(𝑒i) + 𝑔(𝑒j)�𝑟�{𝑔(𝑒i)ΠL + 𝑔(𝑒j)ΠF − 𝑒i}𝑑𝑟, 
where r is the interest rate. Evaluating this integral yields; 
  
g(xi)ΠL + g(xj)ΠF - xi
 r - g(xi) - g(xj)
 .  
Agent i chooses xi to maximize this profit. The first-order condition is arranged to yield 
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  g’(xi)[rΠL + xi + g(xj)(ΠL - ΠF)] - (r + g(xi) + g(xj)) = 0. 
A Nash equilibrium (xi, xj) simultaneously solves the pair of the first-order conditions. The 
symmetric equilibrium where x = xi = xj satisfies 
(1)  g’(x)[rΠL + x + g(x)(ΠL - ΠF)] - (r + 2g(x)) = 0.
10 
This equation identifies two factors determining the equilibrium R&D investments. One is the 
profit ΠL from becoming the leader. The other is (ΠL - ΠF), the leader-follower profit 
differential. R&D investment is motivated by the profit from being the leader but in a two-agent 
race it is also important not to be the follower. As can be easily checked, increases in both 
quantities stimulate investments in R&D. We note this fact in 
Lemma 1: (i) Given (ΠL - ΠF), ∂x/∂ΠL> 0; (ii) given ΠL, ∂x/∂(ΠL - ΠF) > 0.  
3.B. Racing for invention B 
 Once the leader is identified, what follows next is best explained in terms of figure 1. 
When A is discovered, the leader is at the first node in figure 1, where she decides whether to 
patent A. There, she has four choices: patenting A in both countries, in either country or in neither 
country. However, since a patent in one country discloses all the information about invention A to 
the follower, there is no advantage in getting a patent in just one country.11 This narrows down 
the leader’s options to just two: patenting A in both countries or not patenting it in either country. 
 Patenting A, the leader allows the follower to join an R&D race towards B, where each 
can discover it with the equal probability λdt over a short interval dt. If she wins this race, the 
leader owns both inventions worth V. If she loses the race, she still holds the patent on A worth 
αV. Thus, the leader’s (conditional) expected profit evaluated at time t is given by: 
                                                   
10 The second-order conditions hold globally. 
11 Of greater practical importance is the fact that an inventor who gets a patent in one country must file for a 
patent in other countries within twelve months; failing to do so is interpreted as forfeiting the patent rights in 
other countries. 
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(2)  πPH =  
𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛼)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 ,  
where the subscript PH reads “patent holder.” Turning to the follower, if he wins the race, he 
earns βV as he gets the patent on B; if he loses it, he gets nothing. So by an analogous procedure 
the profit to the follower equals: 
  πNP = 
𝜆𝜆𝜆
𝑟 + 2𝜆, 
where NP indicates “non-patent holder”. 
 Alternatively, consider what happens if the leader does not patent A. Then, she alone 
proceeds to discover B while the follower still tries to invent A. If she wins this asymmetric race, 
the game ends with her getting V and the follower getting nothing, as indicated in figure 1. If the 
follower wins instead, he gets to decide whether to patent A.  
 If the follower patents A, the leader will surely challenge him in the U.S., where the FTI 
rule is in use. She can establish priority of invention and get the patent worth αVu so the follower 
holds the patent only in the rest of the world, worth αVw. And both agents move on to compete a 
symmetric race towards B, with a winner picking up the additional profit βV. Therefore, if he 
patents A, the follower faces the expected profit 
(3)  πFW =  
𝜆(2𝛼𝜆w + 𝜆𝜆)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 , 
whereas the leader expects the profit 
(4)  πLU =  
𝜆(2𝛼𝜆u + 𝜆𝜆)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 . 
 Consider next what happens if the follower does not patent A. Then, play moves back to 
the leader, who decides whether to patent A, knowing that the follower has caught up to her. If 
she patents A, she gets the expected profit πPH as the patent holder while the follower gets πNP. If 
she does not, then invention A remains unpatented while both agents try to invent B. If the leader 
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wins this race, she gets patents on both A and B worth V. Even if she loses it, she will still get the 
patent on A in the U.S. Thus, the leader’s expected profit is 
  πLN =  
𝜆(𝛼𝜆u + 𝜆)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 . 
Alternatively, if the follower wins the race towards B, he gets all the patents except on A in the 
U.S., so his expected profit is V - αVu. If he loses the race, he gets nothing. Thus, the follower’s 
expected profit is 
  πFN = 
𝜆(𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆u)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 . 
 3.C. Equilibrium path 
 We now solve the model backward. Consider the leader’s second node in figure 1. If she 
patents A there, her expected profit is πPH. If she does not, her expected profit is πLN. Since πPH > 
πLN the leader patents A. This is intuitive. Since the follower has discovered A, there is no reason 
to hide the information about A. When we move back to the follower’s node, the same intuition 
says that the follower will patent A when he has the chance to do so, since patenting it yields πFW 
to him whereas not patenting it yields only πNP (< πFW).  This is important enough to be 
presented in: 
Proposition 1: If the follower catches up to the leader with his own discovery of invention 
A, he patents it. This yields the expected profits πLU to the leader and πFW to the follower, 
where πLU and πFW are defined in (3) and (4), respectively. 
  We now move back to the leader’s first node in figure 1. Patenting A, the leader faces the 
expected profit πPH as the patent holder. Not patenting A, she starts the asymmetric race, where 
she faces the hazard rate λ while the follower faces the hazard rate g(y), with y denoting his R&D 
investment in this race. Thus, the leader’s expected profit at this node partially depends on g(y). 
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To compute its equilibrium value, observe that winning this asymmetric race yields the expected 
profit πFW to the follower by Proposition 1 whereas losing it he gets nothing. Thus, we can write 
the follower’s expected profit from the asymmetric race as in 
(5)  
𝑔(𝑦)𝜋FW − 𝑦
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦). 
The follower chooses y to maximize this profit. Let y* denote the optimal y, and write the 
corresponding follower’s profit as; 
  ϕF* = 
𝑔(𝑦∗)𝜋FW − 𝑦∗
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗)  . 
 Given y*, the leader’s expected profit can be computed. If she wins the asymmetric race 
she holds the patents on both inventions worth V. If she loses it, the leader’s profit is πLU by 
Proposition 1. Therefore, the profit to the leader, if she does not patent A, is given by 
(6)  ϕL* = 
𝜆𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗)𝜋LU
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗) . 
The next proposition is immediate. 
Proposition 2: In a non-harmonized world, the leader patents invention A if and only if 
πPH ≥ ϕL*.
12  
 We are now in a position to specify the expected profits ΠL and ΠF in (1). If the leader 
patents A, by Proposition 2 we set ΠL = πPH and ΠF = πNP. Substituting these profits into the 
first-order condition (1), we can solve for the symmetric equilibrium level of R&D investment, 
which we denote by xP*, where the subscript P is a mnemonic for “patenting”.  
 On the other hand, if the leader does not patent A at her first node in figure 1, the 
preceding analysis puts ΠL = ϕL* and ΠF = ϕF*. Putting these into (1), we obtain the equilibrium 
                                                   
12 Figure 3 illustrates the parameter condition in our numerical example. 
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R&D investment, which we denote by xN*, where the subscript N stands for “not patenting”. In 
the next section we examine the effect on R&D investments as the U.S. switches from FTI to 
FTF. 
 4. A harmonized world 
 This section considers a world in which both countries use a FTF rule. The analysis 
closely follows that of the previous section, so our description is relatively brief and relies mostly 
on figure 2, analogous to figure 1. 
 Begin at the leader’s second node. If she chooses not to patent A, a race begins towards B 
and a winner gets patent on A and B in both countries, since the leader no longer holds priority of 
invention A in a harmonized world under FTF. Thus, each agents faces the identical expected 
profit of: 
  πN ≡ λV/(r + 2λ). 
On the other hand, patenting A, the leader can secure the patent holder’s profit πPH defined in the 
previous section. Since πPH > πN, the leader patents A. Now, move back to the follower’s node in 
figure 2. If he does not patent A, his expected profit will be πNP as the leader will patent it. On the 
other hand, if he gets patents on A in both countries, he secures αV. Further, if he wins the race 
towards B, he can pick up the additional profit from the patent on B. Thus, a follower’s expected 
profit is: 
  πPH = 
𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛼)
𝑟 + 2𝜆 .  
Since πPH > πNP, the follower patents A, in which case the leader’s expected profit is reduced to 
πNP. The following thus contrasts with proposition 1. 
Proposition 3: If the follower catches up to the leader with his own discovery of invention 
A, he patents it. This yields the expected profits πNP to the leader and πPH. 
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Note that this proposition differs from proposition 1 only in the evaluations of profits. It can be 
shown that πPH > πFW and πNP < πLU, so if play reaches the follower’s node in figure 2, 
international patent law harmonization raises the profit to the follower and reduces the profit to 
the leader. 
 We next turn to the leader’s decision at her first node. If she patents A, she faces the 
expected profit πPH as in a non-harmonized world. If she does not patent A, she launches an 
asymmetric race, where her expected profit depends on the follower’s hazard rate g(y) as before. 
To compute g(y), note that the follower, if he wins the asymmetric race, faces the expected profit 
πPH by proposition 3, so the follower’s expected profit is written as; 
(7)  
𝑔(𝑦)𝜋PH − 𝑦
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦). 
Let y** maximize this expression, and write the corresponding maximal profit as; 
  ϕF** = 
𝑔(𝑦∗∗)𝜋PH − 𝑦∗∗
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗∗) . 
 Now we can compute the leader’s equilibrium profit from the asymmetric race. If she 
wins this race, she holds all the patents valued V. If the follower wins the race, then the leader’s 
profit is πNP by proposition 3. Given the follower’s equilibrium hazard rate g(y**), the leader’s 
profit is expressed as;  
 (8)  ϕL** = 
𝜆𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗∗)𝜋NP
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑔(𝑦∗∗) . 
Proposition 4: In a harmonized world under FTF, the leader patents invention A (at her 
first node) if and only if πPH > ϕL**. 
 We can now determine the equilibrium levels of R&D investment in the race for 
invention A in a harmonized world. Proposition 4 puts ΠL = πPH and ΠF = πNP if the leader 
patents A. Since these profits are the same as in a non-harmonized world, the equilibrium R&D 
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investment is also identical as in the previous section, that is, xP** = xP*. We thus conclude that, 
if the leader patents A in both worlds, patent law harmonization has no effect on R&D 
investments. 
 Suppose, on the other hand, that the leader does not patent A in a harmonized world. 
Then proposition 4 puts ΠL = ϕL** and ΠF = ϕF**. Substituting them into (1), we obtain the 
symmetric equilibrium R&D investments, which we denote by xN**. 
5. The R&D effect of international patent law harmonization 
 In this section, we compare xN* and xN**. We first prove, in appendix A, the following 
key results. 
Proposition 5: (i) ϕL** < ϕL* and (ii) ϕF** > ϕF*. 
The first part of the proposition says that, when the leader does not patent A, harmonization 
lowers her expected profit, whereas the second part states that harmonization raises the follower’s 
profit. This can be explained intuitively as follows. Hold the follower’s investment y in R&D for 
a moment. Then, if the leader does not get a patent on A, her hold on invention A is more tenuous 
in a harmonized world, where the follower can get patents on A in both countries when he 
catches up to her, than in a non-harmonized world, where she has priority of invention in the U.S. 
Thus the leader’s expected profit is smaller in a harmonized world. Similarly, if the follower 
catches up with his own discovery of A, he can get patents on A in both countries in a 
harmonized world, but only in the rest of the world in a non-harmonized world. Thus, the 
follower’s profit is greater in a harmonized world than in a non-harmonized world.  
 In the equilibrium analysis, the follower chooses y, which strengthens the above 
argument. To see this, note that since harmonization raises the expected profit to the follower, the 
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follower invests more in R&D in a harmonized world. The resultant increase in the hazard rate 
g(y) further increases the follower’s expected profit while decreasing the leader’s expected profit. 
 The first part of proposition 5 leads to the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: ϕL* < πPH implies ϕL** < πPH; that is, if the leader patents A in a non-
harmonized world, she does so in a harmonized world as well. 
Thanks to corollary 1 we need consider only the following three mutually exclusive possibilities 
facing the leader at her first node. 
  Case 1: πPH < ϕL** < ϕL* 
  Case 2: ϕL** < πPH < ϕL* 
  Case 3: ϕL** < ϕL* < πPH. 
We consider each case separately. 
Case 1: πPH < ϕL** < ϕL*. 
In this case the leader does not patent A before or after harmonization. Therefore, the expected 
profits are (ΠL, ΠF) = (ϕL*, ϕF*) for a non-harmonized world and (ΠL, ΠF) = (ϕL**, ϕF**) for a 
harmonized world. Then, proposition 5 implies that harmonization decreases the expected profit 
to the leader and increases that to the follower. Then, lemma 1 implies xN** < xN*; that is, 
harmonization reduces investments in R&D for invention A. Intuitively, harmonization makes 
success less rewarding and failure more tolerable, thereby softening R&D competition for the 
leadership. 
Case 2: ϕL** < πPH < ϕL*. 
In this case, harmonization induces the leader to change her decision from not patenting to 
patenting invention A. This puts (ΠL, ΠF) = (ϕL*, ϕF*) in a non-harmonized world and (ΠL, ΠF) 
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= (πPH, πNP) in a harmonized world. Since πPH < ϕL*, harmonization reduces the leader’s profit. 
As for the leader-follower profit difference, we show in appendix B that 
  ∆ ≡ (ϕL* – ϕF*) – (πPH – πNP) > 0, 
i. e., harmonization narrows the leader-follower profit difference as well. Then, we appeal to 
lemma 1 to conclude that xP** < xN*; again harmonization decreases R&D investments for 
invention A.  
Case 3: ϕL** < ϕL* < πPH. 
In this final case, a leader patents A with or without harmonization. Accordingly, the symmetric 
R&D investments are the same in both scenarios, xP* = xP**. Therefore, harmonization has no 
effect on invention. 
 The next proposition summarizes the key findings. 
Proposition 6: 
(A) When πPH < ϕL* international harmonization delays discovery of invention A (xN* > 
xN**). 
(B) When ϕL* ≤ πPH, harmonization has no effect. 
 It is possible to further characterize the condition πPH < ϕL*. Substituting for ϕL* from 
(6) and rearranging, we can rewrite this inequality as; 
(9)  [(r + λ)πPH – λV] + g(y*)(πPH – πLU) < 0. 
Using πPH from (2) and πLU from (4), we can show that the second term is positive since; 
(10)  πPH – πLU = 2αVw/(r + 2λ) > 0, 
so for (9) to hold we must have that  (r + λ)πPH –  λV < 0. This condition in turn can be 
expressed as 
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  (r + λ)(1 + α) – (r + 2λ) = αr – βλ < 0.  
This last inequality is more likely to hold if it is easier to discover invention B (high λ) or if B has 
higher commercial value (large β, small α). 
 We also can characterize the condition in terms of market size. Define µ ≡ Vu  /V; i. e., 
let µ  denote the fraction of total value that accrues from the U.S. market. It can be checked that 
an increase in µ reduces the difference πPH – πLU in (10). Higher µ also reduces πFW given in 
(3), thereby decreasing g(y*) via (5). Thus, an increase in the U.S. share µ reduces the value of 
the third term in (10), making (10) more likely to hold. That is, if the product yields greater value 
in the U.S. market, the necessary condition for delayed invention of A is more likely to be 
satisfied. 
 Delayed discovery of invention A can also delay that of invention B. To clarify such 
possibilities, let us compute the mean time needed for discovery of both inventions, which we 
denote by E(τ) . This is computed by the sum of times needed to discover each invention under 
several scenarios as follows. Agents first compete for invention A, which has the mean discovery 
time 1/(2g(x)). If invention A is not patented, the asymmetric race ensues with discovery of A. 
This phase takes the mean time 1/(g(y) + λ) and ends either with discovery of B by the leader or 
discovery of A by the follower. In the former case the game ends with the leader getting all the 
patents. In the latter, which occurs with probability g(y*)/(g(y*) + λ), the symmetric race towards 
B starts, with the mean time 1/(2λ). Summing these times weighed by probabilities yields 
  E(τ) =1/(2g(x)) + 1/(g(y) + λ) + g(y)/[2λ(g(y) + λ)],13 
which simplifies to 
  E(τ ) = 1/(2g(x)) + 1/(2λ) + 1/[2(g(y) + λ)]. 
On the other hand, if invention A is patented, discovery of A is followed immediately by the 
symmetric race toward B so the mean time needed to discover both inventions is 
                                                   
13 Details are available on request. 
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  E(τ ) =1/(2g(x)) + 1/(2λ).  
 In case 1, invention A is not patented so the mean time for discovery of both invention in 
a non-harmonized world is 
(11)  E(τ 
*) = 1/(2g(xN*)) + 1/(2λ) + 1/[2(g(y*) + λ)] 
whereas that for a harmonized world is 
(12)  E(τ 
**) = 1/(2g(xN**)) + 1/(2λ) + 1/[2(g(y**) + λ)]. 
To compare these two expression, proposition 6 says that xN* > xN**, so the first term on the 
right of (11) is less than that of (12). However, y* < y**, that is, the follower invests more in the 
asymmetric race in a harmonized world because winning gives him πPH instead of πFW. This 
makes the third term on the right of (11) greater than that of (12). Thus, it is not clear whether we 
have E(τ 
*) >  E(τ 
**) or not.  
 In case 2, as invention gets patented, the mean time is 
  E(τ **) =1/(2g(xP**)) + 1/(2λ).  
The difference is 
   E(τ *) - E(τ **) = 1/g(xN*) – 1/g(xP**) + 1/(g(y*) + λ). 
The first two terms sum to a negative number, measuring a delay in discovery of invention A due 
to harmonization, whereas the third term measures the expected duration of the asymmetric race 
that occurs only in a non-harmonized world. Again, it is in general difficult to sign the above 
expression unambiguously. In the next section we specify functional form for the hazard rate 
function and perform simulation exercises to determine the effect on mean time needed to 
discover both inventions. 
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6. Numerical analysis 
 This section numerically evaluates the effect of international harmonization of patent-
issuing rules. Assume the following hazard rate function: 
  g(x) ≡ (2x)0.5 
which satisfies the Inada conditions. Substituting it into the first-order condition (1) yields, after 
routine operations, the equilibrium R&D investment x. The corresponding hazard rate is given 
by: 
  g(x) = {(Θ - r) + [(Θ - r)2 + 6rΠL]
0.5}/3 
as a function of ΠL and Θ ≡ ΠL - ΠF.
14  
 The equilibrium level y* of R&D investment towards A by the follower in an 
asymmetric race can be computed using (5). In the equilibrium without harmonization, the 
hazard rate for the follower is given by: 
  g(y*) = {(r + λ) + [(r + λ)2 + 2πFW (r + λ)]
0.5}, 
An analogous procedure applied to a harmonized world yields y**, which maximizes (8). The 
associated hazard rate is given by; 
  g(y**) = {(r + λ) + [(r + λ)2 + 2πPH (r + λ)]
0.5}. 
Substituting these equilibrium hazard rates into (6) and (8), we can compute ϕL* and ϕL**.   
 We use these equations to draw figures 3 through 6 below for the parameter values V = 
30, α = 0.15, and r = 0.8.15 Figure 3 shows the conditions under which the three cases emerge at 
various values of λ and the relative size of the U.S. market µ. According to figure 3, when λ is 
greater than about 17.5, i.e., it is sufficiently easy to discover invention B, then case 1 occurs, 
independently of the relative size of the U.S. market. When both λ and µ are small, case 3 occurs 
                                                   
14 Derivations are available from the authors upon request.  
15 Parameter values are chosen so that 3D surfaces are easy to see. Our results are robust for all the relevant 
parameter values we considered. Details of the numerical analysis can be obtained from the authors (c.f. 
http://www.econ.hokudai.ac.jp/~ohno/Patent_Num.html). 
  
19 
 
so the leader always patents A irrespective of patent law being harmonized. Thus, we see that the 
leader changes her patenting strategy only when λ is in the intermediate range and µ is relatively 
large. 
 Building on figure 3, figure 4 plots the equilibrium R&D levels for invention A on the 
vertical axis (the axes for λ and µ are interchanged from the previous figures for facile 
presentation). For each point in figure 4, the green surface represents the R&D levels without 
harmonization and the purple surface shows those after harmonization. A comparison confirms 
our result that harmonization decreases R&D investments for invention A except in case 3, where 
harmonization has no impact. 
 Figure 5 shows the mean discovery dates of both inventions, with the purple surface 
representing the dates in a harmonized world. The two surfaces are identical in the regions 
corresponding to case 3, as expected. What is surprising is that in the other regions the purple 
surface lies above the green surface, implying that in cases 1 and 2 harmonization delays 
discovery of both inventions. 
 Figure 6 measures the expected profits to an agent. As the green surface lies above the 
purple one except in case 3, it is found that harmonization decreases the overall expected profits 
to each firm, evaluated at t = 0.  
 The analysis of this section allows us to make inferences about the welfare implications 
of patent law harmonization. Clearly, in case 3 there will be no welfare change. In cases 1 and 2, 
by contrast, we have found that harmonization delays discovery of both inventions and also 
decreases the expected profit to each agent. It follows that world welfare clearly declines as a 
result of harmonization.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
 With the passage of the American Invents Act of 2011, the U.S. has finally decided to 
discard the FTI feature of its patent law in favor of the FTF rule, the international norm. It is the 
objective of this paper to study the effect and ramifications of this controversial policy change in 
a two-country model of R&D competition for two sequential inventions. Our main conclusion is 
that patent law harmonization can undermine innovations and can negatively impact world 
welfare.  
 Further analysis shows that such a possibility increases if basic research is difficult to 
discover but its commercialization is relatively easy, or if inventions generate greater value in the 
U.S. relative to the rest of the world. Thus, our model implies that inventive activities may slow 
down in such industries as pharmaceutical and semiconductor as a result of the America Invents 
Act of 2011. 
 The America Invests Act is expected to come into effect on March 16, 2013. The recent 
empirical work of Lo and Sutthiphisal (2009), studying the Canadian episode, finds that the 
similar rule change instituted in Canada resulted in less investment in R&D in that country. 
We hope that our work will stimulate similar empirical work in the near future. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 5: First we compare a follower’s profits:  
  ϕF* = (g(y*)πFW – y*)/(r + λ + g(y*)) 
for a non-harmonized world, and  
  ϕF** = (g(y**)πPH – y**)/(r + λ + g(y**)) 
for a harmonized world. πPH > πFW implies y**
  > y*. Then it is immediately that ϕF** > ϕF*. 
We next compare a leader’s profits 
  ϕL* = [λV + g(y*)πLU]/(r + λ + g(y*))
 
for a non-harmonized world and  
  ϕL** = [λV + g(y**)πNP]/(r + λ + g(y**)) 
for a harmonized world. Define the function ξ(y) = [λV + g(y)πNP]/(r + λ + g(y)).Then, 
  ξ’(y) = g’(y)[(r + λ)πNP - λV]/(r + λ + g(y))
2.  
Substituting for πNP, we rewrite the expression in brackets on the right as 
  (r + λ)πNP - λV = (r + λ)λβV/(r + 2λ) - λV < 0. 
Thus, m’(y) < 0. Since y** > y*, 
  ϕL** = [λV + g(y**)πNP]/(r + λ + g(y**))  
   < [λV + g(y*)πNP]/(r + λ + g(y*))  
   < [λV + g(y*)πLU]/(r + λ + g(y*)) =  ϕL**, 
where the final inequality follows because πLU > πNP.       
 
Appendix B. Proof that harmonization narrows the leader-follower profit differential in Case 2 
Since ϕL* > πPH, to show ∆ > 0 it suffices to show that  
  πNP – ϕF* = πNP - (g(y*)πFW – y*)/(r + λ + g(y*)) > 0. 
This is equivalent to 
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  D ≡ y* + (r + λ )πNP + g(y*)(πNP – πFW) > 0. 
We thus need only to show D > 0. First, by the definitions ϕL* > πPH implies that  
  ϕL* - πPH = (λ V + g(y*)πLU)/(r + λ + g(y*)) – πPH > 0, 
which simplifies to 
(B1)   g(y*)(πLU - πPH) > (r + λ)πPH – λ V. 
Next, it is easy to verify that 
  πNP + πPH = πLU + πFW = 2λV/(r + 2λ). 
Hence,  
  πNP – πFW = πLU – πPH. 
Substituting, we can rewrite the condition in (B1) as 
  g(y*)(πNP – πFW) > (r + λ)πPH – λV. 
Substituting this into the expression in D, we can show 
  D > y* + (r + λ )(πNP + πPH) – λ V. 
But 
  (r + λ )(πNP + πPH) – λ V = λ V[2(r + λ) /(r + 2λ) – 1] > 0. 
Therefore, D > 0, and ∆ > 0.         
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Figure 1: A World Without Patent Harmonization 
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Figure 2: A Harmonized World 
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Figure 3: Patent or No Patent – 3 Cases 
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Without Harmonization 
After Harmonization 
Figure 4: R&D investments - Harmonization reduces R&D efforts 
 
  
λ µ 
  
28 
 
Without Harmonization 
After Harmonization 
Figure 5: Expected date of delivery is higher with harmonization  
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Without Harmonization 
After Harmonization 
Figure 6: Expected profits of the firms is lower with harmonization 
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